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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how far the education level of the second or 
third generation of publicly traded German family firms affects the post-succession firm 
performance. By conducting a correlational and regression design, the aim is to examine 
how several variables influence the performance of family firms. 
Performance measures, for example ROA and Tobin’s q and variables, like Education 
level and succession periods, examine analytically that a positive succession trend will 
occur. However, with the used model, only a less rigid model shows empirical evidence.  
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1.1 Current Situation and Presentation of the Problem 
Family firms are the most successful companies in Germany (Wulf, Hofmann and Ren-
ner, 2013). FFs account for 95,3 % of all German firms, 41,1 % of total sales and 
61,2 % of all employees subject to social insurance contributions (Haunschild and 
Wolter, 2010; for similar results see Achleitner et al., 2009). Estimations of the IfM 
Bonn show that between 2014 and 2018, about 135.000 transitions to the next genera-
tion took and will take place (Kay and Suprinovic, 2013). Respectively, in family-
owned businesses, the transition to the next generation is a discerning event. Anderson 
and Reeb (2003a) underline in their panel study that family firms perform significantly 
better than non-family firms. 
Andres (2008) examines “the relationship between founding-family ownership and firm 
performance”. He indicates as long as the family “is still active either on the executive 
or the supervisory board”, and no control-enhancing mechanisms are used, the company 
shows superior firm performance (Andres, 2008). In addition, Pérez-González (2006) 
addresses the relevance of the education level of successors in publicly listed family 
firms in the US, and concludes that a higher education level leads to a better perfor-
mance. Goldberg (1996) and Morris et al. (1997) also found a positive correlation be-
tween the education level of the successor and the post-succession firm performance. 
However, this kind of empirical analysis has not yet been carried out for German family 
firms. The question how the education level of the second or third generation in publicly 
traded German family businesses affects the post-succession firm performance has 
therefore not been answered up to now. Hence, this study will analyze - indicate analyt-
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ically - whether German publicly traded family firms show similar results regarding ed-
ucation levels. The research questions therefore are:  
First, what influence does the education level have on the firms’ performance in Ger-
man publicly listed family firms? Second, is there any correlation between those varia-
bles? 
1.2 Objective and Methodology  
The objective of this thesis is to gain insights into the relationship between the educa-
tion level of successors in German family firms and the post succession firm perfor-
mance. 
The thesis starts with a literature review. The models, research questions, variables, 
methods and results of relevant papers will be examined and discussed. The results of 
this examination are the basis for the empirical analysis of the thesis. 
For gathering data of all publicly traded FFs, the DAXplus Family Index is used. Only 
family businesses in the second or third generation will be taken into account. Data 
sources are online databases of comparable financial information for public and private 
companies, such as COMPUSTAT or Bloomberg and DAXplus Family Index. The 
gathered data comprise information on the education of successors and the firm perfor-
mance. Education data will be gathered by using the companies’ websites, and social 
and professional social networks, like Xing and LinkedIn. 
Performance indicators used are ROA, Tobin’s q, return and current market cap. The 
analysis will focus on changes in these performance indicators. The educational degree 
of all successors will be identified and matched with the firm performances. 
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The data then will be analyzed by using statistical methods, and the correlations be-
tween several specific variables will be interpreted in order to answer the research ques-
tions. 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The first chapter describes the problem and the objective of the thesis and the method-
ology. The theoretical basis is presented in chapter 2. The third chapter will give an 
overview of the current state of research with regard to education levels of successors 
and firm performances in family firms. Chapter 4 explains the methods used in the em-
pirical analysis, followed by the results of the analyses, their interpretation and discus-
sion in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with a summary, answers the research 
question and gives an outlook on further studies. 
2 Definitions and Models 
2.1 Family Firms 
Family firms are the foundation for economy and society (Mühlebach, 2004). The lit-
erature on family businesses intensively focused on how to define family firms, but with 
the result that there does not exist a consistent terminology.  
In 2010, the Deutsche Börse Group and the Technische Universität München “intro-
duced two family firm stock indices”. The DAXplus Family 30 shows “the 30 largest 
and most liquid Prime Standard family firms”, whereas the DAXplus Family “is an all-
share index” (Achleitner et al., 2010). “In order to be applicable (…) a firm has to fulfil 
a founding family definition: the founder(s) and/or related family members have to con-
trol at least 25 % of voting rights or at least 5 % voting rights if the founder or the fami-
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ly is not only shareholder but also active management or supervisory board member” 
(Achleitner et al., 2010).  
Summarizing, at least a certain percentage of ownership needs to be in family hands. 
The family can be extended to more than one family. The ownership percentage varies 
from 5 % of voting rights up to more than 25% of voting rights. This thesis relies on the 
definition of a family firm by Achleitner et al. (2010). 
2.2 Succession 
In regard to the word succession, the literature provides no consistent definition 
(Schmeisser et al., 2007). Olbrich (2005) defines succession as the subsumption of all 
processes, where the property of a firm, and, therefore, the executive power, is trans-
ferred to the next generation. Spielmann (1994) defines it as the process of transition of 
the executive, and in terms of capital responsibility of the subsequent generation.  
Family successions, as well as non-family successions, are two possible types of transi-
tion within a family firm. Families prefer a succession inside the family before a non-
family successor will be considered. The professional, as well as the personal abilities 
of a successor are crucial to the success of a transition (Becker & Stephan, 2001). An 
internal successor is the ideal case for the founders. According to the agent theory, 
founders want to minimize agency costs. “Agency costs arise by the separation of own-
ership and control” (Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2012); (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976); (Fama and Jensen, 1983a); (Bocatto et al., 2010); (Denis, 2001). Therefore, 
“family ownership should be effective in coping with agency conflicts, as the shares are 
in the hands of agents” (Songini and Gnan, 2015). This may enhance the firm perfor-
mance (Hoffmann et al., 2014).  
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Another perspective is the stewardship-based theory, which says that family managers 
are motivated by acting as “stewards”, and that the motives align with those of the or-
ganization (Davis, et al., 2010). This theory, however, will not further be discussed 
within this thesis. 
2.3 Performance  
The focus of this thesis lies on the financial performance of firms. Therefore, financial 
indicators will be used in order to gain insights into pre and post succession perfor-
mances. Family firm performance measures will be current market cap, ROA and To-
bin’s q. These financial indicators will be defined in subchapter 4.2.2 
2.4 Education Level 
The main German higher education degrees are Bachelor of Science, Master of Science 
and a doctoral degree. The legal basis is, besides the Bologna Accord, the so-called 
“Framework Act for Higher Education” (in German: Hochschulrahmengesetz) and sev-
eral “federal state legislations (in German: Ländergesetze) in Germany. The older de-
grees, Diploma and Magister, are nowadays equal to a Master. The doctoral degree is 
awarded on the basis of a doctoral thesis (KMK, 2015). In order to achieve a doctoral 
degree, a Master Degree, or a state examination (e.g. for law), is required.  
3 Literature Review    
3.1 Overview of Studies  
Several scholars have extensively stressed founder-led firm performances, as well as the 
performance of internal versus external successors of FFs. The results are divergent (see 
Table 1).  
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3.2 Comparison of Relevant Study Results 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) focused on the “relation between founding-family owner-
ship and performance in large public firms”. Based on profitability measures (ROA) of 
FFs, where the founder descendants serve as CEOs, family firms outperform. This 
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might be caused by family involvement, meaning the founder-family act as stewards in 
the firm. Referring to the market performance, FFs seem to perform “better only in the 
presence of founder CEOs and outside (hired-hand) CEOs” (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003a). Their panel study further implies “that family ownership mitigates managerial 
opportunism” by holding a management position, meaning influencing and monitoring 
the firm (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). In consonance with these authors, Sraer and 
Thesmar`s (2007) study shows that French FFs outperform widely held corporations, as 
well. It is obvious that “this result holds for founder-controlled firms, professionally 
managed family firms, but more surprisingly also for firms run by descendants of the 
founder“ (Sraer and Thomas, 2007). Due to their limited frame of time and sample, this 
interpretation is difficult because only the firms that run best will be transmitted (Sraer 
and Thesmar, 2007). They justify these results by “implicit insurance contracts with the 
labor force in heir-managed firms: employment is less sensitive to industry shocks and 
as a consequence heirs pay lower wages“ (Andres, 2008).  
Contrary to Anderson and Reeb (2003a), Villalonga and Amit’s (2006) Fortune 500 
study found out “when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as chairman 
with a hired CEO”, family management creates value. Similar results were shown by 
Bloom and van Reenen’s (2007) cross-European country study. Their observation dis-
plays that passing management control to descendants, respectively the eldest son, leads 
to a worse performance (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007). Combining professional man-
agement with family ownership might end up in better management practices and per-
formance (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007). They imply that these results, by limiting the 
pool to family members only, will not be efficient in terms of resources (Bloom and van 
Reenen, 2007). In terms of value: “Founder-CEO firms with control-enhancing mecha-
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nisms are about 25 % more valuable than nonfamily firms” (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006). However, the impact of being more valuable depends on how family ownership, 
control (multiple share classes, pyramids, cross-holdings) and management are mixed 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Regarding descendants, firm value will be destroyed if 
they serve as CEO. This could indicate one conflict between non-family shareholders 
and family because descendant CEOs might be more costly in terms of the own-
er/manger conflict (Villalonga and Amit, 2006).  
Pérez-González’ (2006) event study investigates the impact of inherited control on the 
firm performance in family firms. Generally, only unrelated CEOs are correlated with 
abnormal positive returns (Pérez-González, 2006). When successors are related to the 
founder CEO or to larger shareholders, firms will “underperform in terms of operating 
profitability and market to book ratios” (Pérez-González, 2006). Further, by testing for 
nepotism, a lower performance in FFs is ascertained. The differences between appointed 
descendants CEO, who attend either a selective or non-selective college, are striking. 
Further investigations indicate that if descendants “did not attend a selective college”, 
the M-B ratio (“as a proxy for Tobin’s Q”), as well as the ROA decline (e.g., M-B ratio 
is about 25 % lower in three years “relative to firms that promote unrelated CEOs”) (Pé-
rez-González, 2006). In line with this, Pérez-González’ graduate school indicator claims 
that “incoming CEOs – both family and non-family – who pursued graduate studies 
were correlated with higher performance relative to (…) where no graduate program 
was reported” (Pérez-González, 2006). Overall, Pérez-González (2006) shows evidence 
“that nepotism hurts performance by limiting the scope of labor market competition.” 
Goldberg (1996) finds evidence that effective family firm successors were better pre-
pared, in terms of college degrees, in comparison to less effective. When focusing on 
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the Italian environment, Sciascia et al.’s (2014) limited confirmation showed a positive 
effect of later generational stages, and on performance in regard to profit.  
3.3 Research Gaps 
There is no coherent definition on FFs. In addition, most of the studies deal with the US 
market. Research on the educational attainment in combination with the FF perfor-
mance in Germany does not exist. German studies are more general. Andres (2008), for 
example, addresses the importance of active family representation within the board, or 
as one executive. Erhardt et al.’s (2006) investigation shows that FFs seem to outper-
form in terms of operating power, but that performance decreases across generations.  
In particular, endogeneity problems for comparing and identifying FFs emerged. Defini-
tions of family firms vary too much, and data gatherings of non-listed FFs are scarce. 
Taking small different control variables for regression models distorted the comparison 
of the results. In addition, most scholars merely focused on performance in terms of 
profitability. Thereby, the question of targets and their rankings arises. 
In sum, the diversity of framework upon agency theory or RBV, as well as the hetero-
geneity of family firms made it difficult to achieve comparable results. The methodo-
logical approach with regard to relevant indicators is not coherent. Taking the above 
listed research gaps into account an examination on whether or not education attain-




4 Methodology of the Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Selection and Justification of the Research Methodology 
As stated, the purpose of the thesis is to investigate the relationship between the educa-
tion level and the firm performance of family member transitions. To examine whether 
or not inherited control and the educational level of the successors has an impact on the 
firm performance, a quantitative study was performed. By conducting a correlational 
and regression design, the aim is to examine how several variables influence the per-
formance of the firm. Strong model violations are assumed (autocorrelation and hetero-
scedasticity). Therefore, the bootstrapping method is used. In order to gain insight into 
the relationship between inherited control and firm performance, the following (analog) 
regression model is employed: 
𝑦 = ß! + ß! ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒1 + ß! ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑒2 + ß! ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑒3 +   ß! ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒4      
4.1.1 Variables 
In order to define predictor variables, which draw implications about pre versus post 
performances, several subdivisions were undertaken. The subdivisions include the time 
of succession and educational attainment. Below, detailed information is explained and 
figured. The predictor succession (variable 1) is scaled as a dummy. “1” is defined as 
the occurrence of succession and “0” as the immediately preceding time reference cate-
gory. In order to check blurring with other influences, if available, three 1-periods and 
three 0-periods are used. Since effects on an intervention may also occur delayed, the 
variable will be considered as variant with time_lag1 (variable 2) and time_lag2 (varia-
ble 3). The predictor “Educ_Lev” (variable 4) is ordinal scaled. Caused by an ascending 
structure and differentiation in four levels, the variable is used as a quasi-metric to be 
used as one predicator in the regression equation. 
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 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT     
 Educ_Lev : 1 No level/ other  
   2 Bachelor  
   3 Master  
   4 Doctor/ Professor  
      
 TIME of SUCCESSION      
 Succession 
Succession time-lag1  
 : 0 3 years before = pre-performance  
 Succession time-lag2   1 Time of succession + 3 years after = post-
performance 
 
      
Table 2: Overview of used variables   
Source: Own definition  
 
4.1.2 Measures  
The following profitability measures, respectively dependent variables, are used to as-
sess information in regard to inherited firm performances.  
I. Current Market Cap: The current market capitalization measures the corporate 
size. The current market value of all the companies’ outstanding shares are stat-
ed in the pricing currency. It is computed by multiplying the outstanding share 
times its last price. 
II. ROA: The ROA is calculated by using: !"#  !"#$%&   !"#$"%&'()*'
!"#$%  !""#$"
. 
III. Tobin’s q: As a proxy for M-B ratio, Tobin’s q is used. Tobin’s q is “the market 
value of total assets divided by the replacement cost of assets” (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003a). 
4.2 Selection of the Target Group and Samples 
In order to gather relevant data of inherited and controlled family firms, several steps 
were taken into consideration: 
I. Identifying publicly traded family firms: Therefore, the constructed family firm 
stock index of Deutsche Börse Group (Achleitner et al., 2010), called DAXplus 
Family Index, was chosen. The advantage of choosing the DAXplus Family in-
dex is that the definition of family firms is comparable (see subchapter 2.1) 
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II. Limiting the sample to the second and third generation: All DAXplus Family 
listed companies, as well as board members, supervisory board members and 
management were analyzed with regard to family members. Often, the identifi-
cation of family members was complicated due to changed family names (e.g. 
marriage). Striking was that many companies were in the first or even in the 
fourth generation. However, these companies were not taken into account be-
cause the aim is to examine the education level effect of the second and the third 
generation. This limitation leads to a sample of 19 successors in 14 companies 
(see appendix 1).  
III. Gathering personal information: This step was to gather relevant personal in-
formation. Therefore, the companies’ homepage, LinkedIn, Xing and Google 
with social and professional links, were used. Appendix 2 displays the personal 
information.  
IV. Gathering financial data: Financial data were used for analyzing firm perfor-
mances. The data were taken from COMPUSTAT and Bloomberg. The limited 
time frame of successors reduced the sample. The data were taken unexamined 
and uncorrected. Hence, the data might contain outliers (see the following chap-
ter; figure 2). These special effects and influences were not examined and not 
straightened within the thesis and therefore might cause systematic errors.  
V. Time lagged performance changes: By adding the variables time_lag1 and 
time_lag2 to the regression model, the sample of succession is reduced. Out of 
14 companies (Chapter 4.2, II), only four companies could be accepted for the 
chosen model (see yellow-marked lines in appendix 1 and appendix 3).  
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4.3 Derivation of Hypotheses 
The following analysis is based on the assumption that there is a correlation between the 
key performance indicators (Current market cap, ROA and Tobin’s q) and their ex-
planatory variables: succession and education level. 
To formulate the hypotheses, the following variables (dependent and independent) are 
used. The three dependent variables: current market cap, ROA and Tobin’s q depend on 
the four predictors: succession, succession_lag1, succession_lag2 and Educ_Lev. The 
thesis addresses the following hypotheses:  
H1: The (current) market cap correlates positively with the four predictors. 
H2: ROA correlates positively with all four predictors. 
H3: A positive correlation between Tobin’s q and its predictors exists. 
The fourth and fifth hypotheses – with the same model –address only two variables. 
H4: ROA growths with a time-lagged succession (succession_lag1) of one period, and a 
higher education level. 
H5: Tobin’s q increases with a later stage of time-lagged succession (succession_lag2), 
and a higher education level (Educ_Lev).  
5 Results of the Empirical Analysis  
5.1 Overview of the Results  
The collected data refer to companies in the period from 1989 to 2014. Thus, a panel 
structure with variable NAME as panel-ID and the years 1989 to 2014 as WAVES were 
given. As the variable Educ_Lev has time-constant values, one random evaluation is 
needed. The graphical analysis of potential dependent variables indicated a rising trend 
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of the data series. Representative, the current market cap is shown below (y-axis: in mil-
lion €) (see figure 1). 
  
Figure 1: Current market cap-trend of the observed companies (own illustration) 
Source: Data from COMPUSTAT and Bloomberg, illustrated in STATA 
 
The changes of the time series nourishes the assumption that phenomena, such as auto-
correlation (“leads to inefficient estimation of the coefficients”) and/or heteroscedastici-
ty could lead to a reduced accuracy of significance statements (Kohler and Kreuter, 
2012). Therefore, STATA provides a bootstrapping based on robust estimation 
(vce(bootstrap)) (see Appendices 4, 5 and 6).  
Below, table 3 shows the correlation matrix among dependent and independent varia-
bles. Depending on the chosen variables, one can see if a positive or a negative relation-
ship of the variable exists or not.  
Table 3: Correlation matrix among variables  
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AHLERS AG ARTNET AG
BECHTLE AG COMPUGROUP MEDICAL AKTIEN
FUCHS PETROLUB SE KRONES AG
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STROEER SE USU SOFTWARE AG
UZIN UTZ AG WEBER (GERRY) INTERNATNL AG
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5.2 Summary of Significant Insights of the Analysis and their Interpretation 
The variables succession, succession_lag1, succession_lag2 and Educ_Lev exert a posi-
tive significant effect on the target measures. For answering the hypothesis, the algebra-
ic sign, as well as details of the significance statements are important. The model-
significance statement is described by the following size: Prob > chi2. As long as the 
number is < 0.05, the model works out (C1: significance of the model). 
In a second step (C2: significance of the predictors), if the model is significant, it will 
be examined, whether or not the individual predictors have a significant effect on the 
target variable. This statement is checked by the size of: P> | z | (p-value has to be to 
smaller than 0.05; if yes, the variable has a significant influence on the dependent varia-
ble). 
If the predictor is significant, the algebraic sign is evaluated in the last step (C3: positive 
algebraic sign). Since all the hypotheses assume a positive relationship, the regression 
coefficient should be positive. These results are shown in the following cross-table (ta-
ble 4): 
Hypothesis   Succession Succession_lag1 Succession_lag2 Educ_Lev  
  Prob > chi2 P>|z| ; algebraic 
sign  
P>|z| ; algebraic sign P>|z| ; algebraic 
sign 




0.0000 0.895 ; + 0.000 ; + 0.034 ; + 0.000 ; -  
2 ROA 0.0000 0.031 ; - 0.052 ; + 0.327 ; - 0.000 ; +  
3 TOBINS_Q 0.0000 0.950 ; - 0.887 ; - 0.064 ; + 0.065 ; +  
Table 4: Cross-table of results 
Source: Own table 
 
The individual regressions are:  
I. Current Market Cap = 522.0935 + 4.55785 * Succession + 34.17548 * Succes-
sion_lag1 + 129.7493 * Succession_Lag2 -102.2398 * Educ_Lev 
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II. ROA = -.1440109 - .0299376 * Succession + .1024897 * Succession_lag1 -
.0745387 * Succession_Lag2 + .0573749 * Educ_Lev 
III. TOBINS_Q = -.134575 -.01125 * Succession -.0145 * Succession_lag1 + 
.3435375 * Succession_Lag2 + .4263333 * Educ_Lev 
Hypothesis 1: The model is significant, Succession is not significant; Succession_lag1, 
Successin_lag2 and Educ_Lev are significant; Educ_Lev has the wrong algebraic sign. 
The current market cap does not show the empirical evidence on how the educational 
level of the successor influences the post performance of the FF. Nevertheless, a posi-
tive trend of a current market cap occurred.  
Hypothesis 2: The model is significant; Succession, Succession_lag1 and Educ_Lev are 
significant, but Succession_lag2 not; moreover, the algebraic signs in Succession and 
Succession_lag2 are wrong. 
ROA’s model is significant. However, the model will be rejected.  
Hypothesis 3: The model is significant; all predictors are non-significant.  
Tobin’s Q model is significant, but the predictors are not.  
Assuming that all conditions must be true for an acceptance of a hypothesis, all four hy-
potheses are rejected. Thus, one needs to consider whether or not a less rigid hypothesis 
formulation is useful. It is conceivable, for example, to consider whether it is not 
enough if one of the three succession variables achieves the intended condition. 
Referring to this particular model, the thesis illustrates four highly significant models. 
Nevertheless, the explanatory value might be conflicting.  
By restricting, in this particular model, to only two predictors, it can be seen that 
Educ_Lev and succession_lag1 have a positive impact on ROA. Therefore, the hypothe-
sis 4 cannot be rejected. This means that positive changes will occur, but time lagged 
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only (1 year). Hypothesis 5: A positive correlation between Tobin’s Q and Educ_Lev 
and a succession_lag 2 exists in this model. Thus, the hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
5.3 Classification of the Results in the Field of Research and Further Needs and 
Limitations 
Several approaches were taken into consideration in order to gain insights on family 
firm successions on German publicly listed family firms. However, the thesis fails to 
support evidence that in this particular regression model all measures correlate positive-
ly. Nonetheless, H4 and H5 cannot be rejected. Referring to Pérez-González (2006), who 
said that there is a positive correlation between a higher education level and post per-
formance, the thesis supports this view, even in different time-lagged periods.  
According to Sciascia et al.’s (2014) and Sraer and Thesmar’s (2007) inherited control 
and performances, the thesis suggests, in this particular model, a positive relationship, 
as well.  
The overall question on how convincing the observed results are is still unanswered. As 
mentioned before, different models were used, as well as different definitions for family 
firms. The delimitations of the thesis limited its generalizability. The small number of 
observed companies, as well as the observed time periods led to a smaller sample, and, 
respectively, to time-lagged succession periods. This implies that the determination of 
the intervention is difficult to describe. Further, the family/member ownership and in-
fluence were a) not considered b) questionable (in regard to how statistically quantifia-
ble they are). Using different dummies will lead to different model variations and other 
results (e.g. instead of three pre and post periods only two ones). In order to expand the 
thesis and pose possible needs for future studies, the current thesis suggests assembling 
control variables to make it more stable. In addition, the sample should be greater than 
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the one used. For future research, questions of the component FFs versus non-FF and 
active versus passive control (family embeddedness) should be explored more deeply. 
Future research should focus more comprehensively how much family influence is nec-
essary. Finally, a quantitative analysis on privately held companies will still be a large 
problem, due to the lack of gathering financial data.  
6 Summary and Conclusion  
The main findings of this thesis present various results on firm performance of succes-
sors. First, scholars differ in defining family firms. Second, scholars choose different 
approaches to test the family influence, examining whether or not pre versus post per-
formance lead by descendants. Thereby, the comparability is not stringently proved. 
According to the written research questions: “What influence does the education level 
have on the firms’ performance in German publicly listed family firms? Is where any 
correlation between those variables?” the thesis answers both ones.  
Family involvement “can have both positive and negative performance consequences” 
(Hofmann et al., 2014). As the aim of this panel data analysis was to examine the effect 
of different education levels and succession on post performances, in this particular 
model, only less rigid hypotheses could be accepted. Results show that ROA and To-
bin’s q illustrate a time-lagged (later stage) positive correlation on FF performance. In 
this regard, the thesis shows evidence, according to Pérez-González (2006), that the 
same performance measures have a positive impact on post-performances. Moreover, 
the thesis highlights that family influence and performance, respectively research of in-
herited control in Germany, was not often examined.  
Nevertheless, the limitations, mentioned in chapter 5.3, are opportunities for further re-
search in Germany.  
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Appendix 1: Overview of the Sample 
Company Name 
Quantity  Generation 
 
Names:  MGT position / board = yes IPO Succession 
 
  
     
Bechtle 1 2nd  Karin Schick Yes March 2000 Not found 
Fuchs 2 3rd  Dr. Manfred Fuchs (2nd) Yes 30.01.85 1985-2015 
    Stefan Fuchs (3rd) Yes  2001 
Gerry Weber 1 2nd  Ralf Weber (2nd) Yes 19.10.89 2013 -td 
Krones 2 2nd  Volker Kronsender (2nd) Yes 
29.19.84 
1988- td 
    Norman Kronsender (2nd) Yes Not found 
Nemetschek 1 2nd  Dr. Alexander Nemetschek (2nd) Yes 10.03.99 2008 - td 
Sixt 2 2nd  Alexander Sixt (3rd) Yes 
01.07.86 
2015 - td 
    Konstantin Sixt (3rd) Yes 2015 - td 
Ströer 1 2nd  Dirk Stöer (2nd) Yes 2010 2004- td 
Ahlers 2 2nd/ 3rd  Jan A. (2nd) Yes 
1987 
1968-2012 
    Dr. Stella A. Ahlers (3rd) Yes 2005 - td 
Artnet 1 2nd  Jacob Pabst (2nd) Yes 17.05.99 2012 - td 
CompuGroup Medical 1 2nd  Prof. Dr. med. Daniel Gotthardt (2nd) Yes 04.05.07 2003 - td 
OHB 1 2nd  Marco R. Fuchs (2nd) Yes 13.03.01 2000- td 
Sto 2 3rd  Jochen Friedrich Stotmeister (2nd) Yes 
Nowadays different structure 
1988- td 
    Gerd Stotmeister (2nd) Yes Not found 
USU Software 1 2nd  Dr. Benjamin Strehl (2nd) Yes 21.03.00 2014 td 
Uzin Utz 1 2nd/ 3rd  Dr. H. Werner Utz (3rd) Yes 14.10.97 1980- td 
 
Source: DAXplus Family   
 
Appendix 2: Education Level of Successors
Information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Company6name amount generation Name Educationlevel no6level6/other Bachelor6 Master6/6Diploma Doctor6/6Prof. MBA Location Germany6 International ivy6league background buisness tech other
(highest6level)
Bechtle 1 2nd Karin*Schick* Accounting*employee 1
2 3rd Manfred*Fuchs*(2nd) Business*administration 3 4 7 10
Stefan*Fuchs*(3rd) Business*administration 3 7 10
Gerry6Weber 1 2nd Ralf*Weber*(2nd) Business*administration 3 7 10
2 2nd Volker*Kronsender*(2nd) (FH)*Master*of*Business*and*
Engineering
3 7 10 11
Norman*Kronsender*(2nd) Forest*manager 1 7 12
Nemetschek 1 2nd Dr.*Alexander*Nemetschek*(2nd) 4 7 11
2 2nd Alexander*Sixt*(3rd) Business*administration 3 8 10
Konstantin*Sixt*(3rd) Business*administration 3 8 10
Ströer 1 2nd Dirk*Stöer*(2nd) Business*administration 3 7 10
2 2nd/*3rd Jan*A.*Ahlers**(2nd) (FH) 3 7 10
Dr.*Stella*A.*Ahlers*(3rd) Theology 4 7 12
Artnet 1 2nd Jacob*Pabst*(2nd) Business*administration 3 7 10
Compu6Group6Medical 1 2nd Prof.*Dr.*med.*Daniel*Gotthardt*(2nd)* 4 7 8 12
OHB 1 2nd Marco*R.*Fuchs*(2nd) 1 7 8 12
2 2nd Jochen*Friedrich*Stotmeister*(2nd) Business*administration 3 7 10
Gerd*Stotmeister*(2nd) 3 7 11
USU6Software 1 2nd Dr.*Benjamin*Strehl*(2nd) Business*administration 3 4 7 8 10











Appendix 3: Financial Data of the relevant four Companies (for all: see separate file)  
 
 
Source: COMPUSTAT and Bloomberg 
	  
Appendix 4: Current Market Cap 
analysis and its syntax 
Source: Own calculations 
	  
Appendix 5: ROA analysis and its 
syntax  
Source: Own calculations 
	  
Appendix 6: Tobin’s q analysis and 
its syntax  
Source: Own calculations  
 
 












2001 177,76 379,731 0,048540056 1,283 4
2002 157,15 350,488 0,048438706 1,2216 0 4
2003 144,6845 327,828 0,061196608 1,3812 0 4
2004 164 319,901 0,0807341 1,4593 0 4
2005 210,672 325,291 0,077860891 1,5981 1 4
2006 239,2558 245,936 0,38013932 1,3137 1 4
2007 170,384 259,892 0,039406665 1,1665 1 4
2008 93,936 268,097 6,19561E-05 0,8945 1 4
2009 102,96 249,44 0,024514211 1,08 4
2010 142,496 250,8 0,044487295 1,2574 4


























1999 16,6132 110,366 0,01435032 1,2356 4
2000 36,792 96,999 0,021141851 1,4358 0 4
2001 42,5407 108,736 0,001263067 1,6535 0 4
2002 43,8438 51,803 0,100838202 1,5705 0 4
2003 110,109 68,809 0,013454493 1,9641 1 4
2004 146,6285 87,417 0,08380083 1,8621 1 4
2005 174,344 119,923 0,109068436 1,9281 1 4
2006 466,8622 144,823 0,053294626 2,9367 1 4
2007 697,705 185,323 0,078873018 2,7981 4
2008 160,7223 234,916 0,00411429 0,9427 4


























1997 172,8163 1540,078 0,013159922 1,1544 3
1998 190,8307 1543,672 0,00392426 1,096 0 3
1999 142,1791 834,048 0,024554979 1,053 0 3
2000 139,5142 901,976 0,02477661 1,0436 0 3
2001 152,3196 940,006 0,011582362 1,0509 1 3
2002 168,4782 1064,724 0,034103673 1,0933 1 3
2003 351,7445 1040,9 0,046705457 1,3547 1 3
2004 645,0702 1096,3 0,062042634 1,7782 1 3
2005 839,0943 1192,2 0,105887458 1,8581 3
2006 1411,1569 1323,3 0,141912737 2,5182 3


























2004 96,25 96,636 0,062152123 1,4247 4
2005 135,7125 98,776 0,144116993 2,1029 0 4
2006 212,7125 107,623 0,066584367 1,774 0 4
2007 207,4187 146,514 0,078231256 1,7833 0 4
2008 99,9075 150,603 0,061932154 1,1986 1 4
2009 155,3475 136,099 0,076744959 1,4846 1 4
2010 306,7488 150,987 0,114597322 2,2984 1 4
2011 248,325 165,12 0,128090676 1,8986 1 4
2012 319,55 176,982 0,118264516 2,3395 4
2013 484,33 187,613 0,134513145 3,0603 4
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Statistics/Data Analysis
      name:  <unnamed>
       log:  C:\Users\Harald\Desktop\Kempers Ergebnisübersicht 12.12..smcl
  log type:  smcl
 opened on:  12 Dec 2015, 17:21:19
1 . do "C:\Users\Harald\AppData\Local\Temp\STD00000000.tmp"
2 . xtset ID Year
       panel variable:  ID (unbalanced)
        time variable:  Year, 1989 to 2014
                delta:  1 unit
3 . 
end of do-file
4 . do "C:\Users\Harald\AppData\Local\Temp\STD00000000.tmp"
5 . xtreg CurentMarketCap Succession Succession_lag1 Succession_lag2 Educ_Lev, re vce(bo
> otstrap)
(running xtreg on estimation sample)
Bootstrap replications (50)
 1  2  3  4  5 
x....xx.x.x......x..x....x.xx.x......xxxx.x.x.xx.x    50
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        20
Group variable: ID                              Number of groups   =         4
R-sq:  within  = 0.3554                         Obs per group: min =         5
       between = 0.9526                                        avg =       5.0
       overall = 0.4215                                        max =         5
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =   5049.70
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                         (Replications based on 4 clusters in ID)
                   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based
CurentMarketCap       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
     Succession     4.55785   34.42213     0.13   0.895    -62.90829    72.02399
Succession_lag1    34.17548   5.293342     6.46   0.000     23.80072    44.55023
Succession_lag2    129.7493   61.28825     2.12   0.034     9.626567    249.8721
       Educ_Lev   -102.2398   6.893616   -14.83   0.000    -115.7511   -88.72858
          _cons    522.0935   34.75129    15.02   0.000     453.9822    590.2048
        sigma_u           0
        sigma_e   128.03381
            rho           0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
6 . xtreg Assets Succession Succession_lag1 Succession_lag2 Educ_Lev, re vce(bootstrap)
(running xtreg on estimation sample)
Bootstrap replications (50)
 1  2  3  4  5 
....xxx....x.xx.x.x.xx.x.xxx...xx.....x.....xx...x    50
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        20
Group variable: ID                              Number of groups   =         4
R-sq:  within  = 0.1129                         Obs per group: min =         5
       between = 0.9720                                        avg =       5.0
       overall = 0.9523                                        max =         5
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =  12261.71
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
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                                         (Replications based on 4 clusters in ID)
                   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based
         Income       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
     Succession   -4.340675   1.123729    -3.86   0.000    -6.543143   -2.138207
Succession_lag1     25.8275   12.52031     2.06   0.039     1.288149    50.36685
Succession_lag2   -16.42713   16.66824    -0.99   0.324    -49.09627    16.24202
       Educ_Lev    -6.33582   4.668521    -1.36   0.175    -15.48595    2.814313
          _cons    36.86675   15.19751     2.43   0.015     7.080172    66.65333
        sigma_u    3.044117
        sigma_e   19.398873
            ho   .02403283   (fra tion of varian e due to u_i)
11. xtreg ROA Succession Succe sion_lag1 Succession_lag2 Educ_Lev, re vce(bootstrap)
(running xtreg on estimation sample)
Bootstrap replications (50)
 1  2  3  4  5 
x.x.x.....x...x...x.x.........x..xx..xx......x.x..    50
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        20
Group variable: ID                              Number of groups   =         4
R-sq:  within  = 0.2289                         Obs per group: min =         5
       between = 0.7220                                        avg =       5.0
       overall = 0.2994                                        max =         5
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =   3089.37
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                         (Replications based on 4 clusters in ID)
                   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based
            ROA       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
     Succession   -.0299376   .0138662    -2.16   0.031    -.0571149   -.0027603
Succession_lag1    .1024897   .0527981     1.94   0.052    -.0009927    .2059721
Succession_lag2   -.0745387   .0761056    -0.98   0.327    -.2237029    .0746255
       Educ_Lev    .0573749   .0118278     4.85   0.000     .0341929     .080557
          _cons   -.1440109    .044755    -3.22   0.001    -.2317291   -.0562926
        sigma_u           0
        sigma_e   .07799331
            rho           0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
12. xtreg TOBINS_Q Succession Succession_lag1 Succession_lag2 Educ_Lev, re vce(bootstrap
> )
(running xtreg on estimation sample)
Bootstrap replications (50)
 1  2  3  4  5 
x.....x.xx.....xx...xx..x.x....xx..xx.....xx..x...    50
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        20
Group variable: ID                              Number of groups   =         4
R-sq:  within  = 0.2130                         Obs per group: min =         5
       between = 0.3154                                        avg =       5.0
       overall = 0.2608                                        max =         5
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =   1322.24
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
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                                         (Replications based on 4 clusters in ID)
                   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based
         Income       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
     Succession   -4.340675   1.123729    -3.86   0.000    -6.543143   -2.138207
Succession_lag1 25.8275 12.52031    2.06 0.039     1.288149    50.36685
Succession_lag2   -16.42713   16.66824    -0.99   0.324    -49.09627    16.24202
       Educ_Lev    -6.33582   4.668521    -1.36   0.175    -15.48595    2.814313
          _cons    36.86675   15.19751     2.43   0.015     7.080172    66.65333
        sigma_u    3.044117
sigma_e 19.398 73
            rho   .02403283   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
11. xtreg ROA Succession Succession_lag1 Succession_lag2 Educ_Lev, re vce(bootstrap)
(running xtre  on estimation sample)
Bootstrap replications (50)
 1  2  3  4  5 
x.x.x.....x...x...x.x.........x..xx..xx......x.x..    50
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        20
Group variable: ID                              Number of groups   =         4
R-sq:  within  = 0.2289                         Obs per group: min =         5
       between = 0.72 0                  avg =       5.0
       overall = 0.2994                  max =         5
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =   3089.37
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)   Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                         (Replications based on 4 clusters in ID)
                   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based
            ROA       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
     Succession   -.0299376   .0138662    -2.16   0.031    -.0571149   -.0027603
Succession_lag1    .1024897   .0527981     1.94   0.052    -.0009927    .2059721
u cession_lag2   -.0745387 .0761056   -0.98   0.327    -.2237029    .0746255
  Educ_Lev    .0573749 .0118278   4.85   0.000     .0341929     .080557
          _cons   -.1440109    .044755    -3.22   0.001    -.2317291   -.0562926
  sigma_u           0
        sigma_e   .07799331
            rho           0   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
12. xtreg TOBINS_Q Succession Succession_lag1 Succession_lag2 Educ_Lev, re vce(bootstrap
> )
(running xtreg on estimation sample)
Bootstrap replications (50)
 1  2  3  4  5 
x.....x.xx.....xx...xx..x.x....xx..xx.....xx..x...    50
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        20
Group variable: ID                              Number of groups   =         4
R-sq:  within  = 0.2130                         Obs per group: min =         5
       between = 0.3154                                        avg =       5.0
       overall = 0.2608                                        max =         5
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =   1322.24
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
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                                         (Replications based on 4 clusters in ID)
                   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based
       TOBINS_Q       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
     Succession     -.01125   .1787575    -0.06   0.950    -.3616083    .3391083
Succession_lag1      -.0145   .1020768    -0.14   0.887    -.2145668    .1855668
Succession_lag2    .3435375   .1855227     1.85   0.064    -.0200804    .7071554
       Educ_Lev    .4263333   .2306371     1.85   0.065     -.025707    .8783737
          _cons    -.134575   .8061605    -0.17   0.867     -1.71462     1.44547
        sigma_u   .34375876
        sigma_e   .38607174





      name:  <unnamed>
       log:  C:\Users\Harald\Desktop\Kempers Ergebnisübersicht 12.12..smcl
  log type:  smcl
 closed on:  12 Dec 2015, 17:22:15
